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Public  Economics
Can private educational institutions, responding  stJong case can be made for targeted subsides
to financial incentives and constraints, play more  su.ch  as scholarships and/or loan guarantees
of a role in helping society provide efficient and  available only to students from low-income
equitable post-secondary education?  This  families (and only to low-income students with
question is important because budget constraints  good marks, if one goal is efficiency).
are forcing developing countries to look for
alternatives to heavily subsidized public serv,  A general subsidy to all post-secondary
ices.  The authors review the literature, focusing  students, designed to allow low-income students
on how public subsidies can be used to meet  to attend school, mighL  have a regressive impact
social objectives when education is privately  because children from higher-income families
provided.  are more likely to use the subsidy than children
frorn low-income families - all the more so if
The appropriate level of public subsidy to  the subsidy is rationed by good marks.
private post-secondary education hinges in part
on the extent to which social exceed private  The paper also discusses ways to promote
benefits.  quality arnong private institutions.  Certain
government policies may influence '^ gher
In recent years there is increasing evidence  education at least as much as various  borms  of
in many developing countries of a growing  direct regulation or subsidy. The most efficient
problem of graduate unemployment and tenden-  way to make schools better is probably to design
cies toward "credentialism" in the allocation of  an incentive system that rewards institutions on
desirable jobs in the public sector and elsewhere.  the basis of how their graduates perform -
Higher education is also perceived as a socially  although this might favor students from high-
unproductive but privately profitable screen or  income families.
signalling device.  The authors argue that public
subsidies should be targeted toward disciplines  In addition, inappropriate labor market
that have high social returns. They call for more  legislation and government behavior as an
empirical work to allow policymakers to distin-  employer may have contributed to problems of
guish among activities.  graduate unemployment, credentialism, and a
generaUy swollen bureaucracy in some coun-
If subsidies are to be used to make private  tries.
higher education more accessible to the poor, a
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The  fundamental  question  considered  in this  paper  is  whether  private
educational  institutions,  responding  to financial  incentives  and  constraints,
can  play  an expanded  role  in  helping  attain  society's  objectives  with  respect
to the  efficiency  and  equity  of the  system  of post-secondary  education.
With  respect  to the  efficiency  issue,  the  key  question  is  whether
the  social  benefits  of  higher  education  tend  to  exceed  or fall  short  of the
private  benefits. Traditionally,  the  presumption  has  been that  factors  such
as capital  market  imperfections,  and  the  general  scarcity  of educated  manpower
in  many  developing  countries,  'Lave  led  to a situation  where  the  social
exceeded  the  private  benefits. However,  in  recent  years  there  has  been
evidence  in  many  developing  countries  of a growing  problem  of  graduate
unemployment,  and  tendencies  toward  "credentialism"  in  the  allocation  of
desirable  jobs in  the  public  sector  and  elsewhere. In addition,  the
perception  of  higher  education  serving  as a socially  unproductive  but
privately  profitable  screen  or signalling  device  may  be as relevant  in  some
developing  countries  as in  the  industrialized  nations  for  which  the  screening
theories  were  originally  developed. If so,  the  private  benefits  for  many
types  of  higher  education  are  higher  than  the  social. This  clearly  would  have
important  implications  for  the  question  whether  higher  education  should  be
subsidized.  Because  this  question  is  so important,  more  empirical  work  on
these  issues  should  be a high  priority.
Private  post-secondary  education  also  raises  several  important
equity  issues. In  some  respects,  there  is  no conflict  between  the  equity  and
efficiency  objectives:  policies  that  counteract:  the  effects  of  capital  market
imperfections,  especially  for  low-income  families,  are  an  example. On the
other  hand,  there  are  other  types  of equity-oriented  policies  that  do pose  a
conflict  with the  efficiency  objective.  An example  is a  general  subsidy  to
all  post-secondary  students  as a  means  of allowing  low-income  students  access
to  universities.  Such  a subsidy  is likely  to  have  a regressive  impact  because
children  from  higher-income  families  are  more likely  to  make  use  of the
subsidy  then  children  from  low-income  families. This  impact  may  be
exace:rbated  if  access  to the  subsidy  is  rationed  by marks,  for  similar- ii  -
reasons. If  higher  education  serves  primarily  as  a screen  or signalling
device,  the  regressive  impact  may  be even  worse,  since  an education  subsidy
will then  in  effect  reduce  the  cost  to individuals  who  are  fortunate  enough  to
have  high  productivity  to oegin  with.  In  addition,  when  education  primarily
serves  a screening  function,  its  private  profitability  is likely  to  be
considerably  higher  than  its  social  profitability.  Thus,  general  subsidies  to
post-secondary  education  will  be inconsistent  with  the  efficiency  objective  as
well.
On the  whole,  the  general  subsidization  of  higher  education  may  be a
highly  inefficient,  or aven  counterproductive,  way  of redistributing  income
from  rich  or  poor.  If  subsi.dies  are  to  be  used to  create  more  equitable
access,  a strong  case  can  be made  for  targeted  subsides,  e.g.,  scholarships
a..nd/or  loan  guarantees  available  only  to  students  from  low-income  families.
In this  context,  a combination  of targeted  subsides  and  rationing  access  by
marks  may  represent  a sensible  way of  promoting  both  equity  and  efficiency  (if
secondary  school  marks  are  correlated  with  a student's  ability  to gain
productivity  through  education).
The subsidy  issue  arises  also  with  respect  to  educational  quality.
Here  we argue  that  the  most  efficient  way of  raising  quality  is probably  to
design  an incentive  system  which  rewards  institutions  on the  basis  of the
performance  of their  graduates.  This  would  give  institutions  an incentive  to
make efficient  use  of all  inputs  into  the  production  of education  services,
while  a strategy  of subsidizing  quality  by means  of subsidies  to  particular
inputs  will  create  distortions  in the  production  process. A problem  with  a
performance-based  strategy,  however,  is that  it  may  have  a regressive
distributional  impact,  since  students  from  high-income  families  are  more
likely  to  perform  well in  examinations  and  therefore  indirectly  ber.,fit  from
such  subsidies.
Finally,  there  are  certain  important  government  policies  which  do
not  directly  effect  the  education  system,  but  which  are  likely  to  have  a very
significant  indirect  impact  because  they  affect  the  labor  market  for  graduates- iii  -
from the  post-secondary  system. These  policies  involve  such  things  as labor
market  legislation,  and  the  behavior  of the  government  as an  employsr.
Inappropriate  policies  with  respect  to this  market  may  have contributed  to
problems  of graduate  unemployment,  credentialism,  and  a generally  swollen
bureaucracy  in  some  countries. In turn,  these  factors  have  contributed  to
creating  a wedge  between  the  social  and  private  profitability  of  higher
education,  with  consequences  that  have  been  outlined  above. Government
policies  in  these  areas  may  be at least  as important  in  influencing  the
functioning  of the  higher  education  system  as  various  forms  of direct
regulation  or subsidy.I.  INTRODUCTION
Tertiary  education  in  developing  countries  confronts  a number  of
critical  problems  today. One  is  the  availability  of resources.  Many
developing  countries  have  tighter  budgetary  constraints  as they  adjust  to
macroeconomic  conditions.  This  has  impinged  on  higher  education  since  the
public  sector  plays  a  predominant  role  in its  financing  and  provision.
Another  problem  concerns  the  public  sector's  effectiveness  in
providing  the  type  and  quality  of  education  needed  for  economic  development.
Quality  is  often  considered  to  be low  and  deteriorating.  Moreover,  many
educational  systems  cannot  match  its  graduates  with the  economy's  labor  force
requirements.  Some  countries  confront  a  worsening  problem  in graduate
unemployment;  others  cannot  fill  the  demand  for  skills  in some  disciplines;
and in  many  countries,  both  phenomena  can  be observed.
Finally,  public  subsidies  to  higher  education  may  have  a regressive
distributional  impact. Despite  massive  expansion,  higher  education  in  many
countries  continues  to  be relatively  inaccessible  to  students  from  poor
families.y
One  approach  to  these  problems  is  to seek  improvements  in  the
financing,  efficiency  and  equity  of publicly-provided  higher  education. These
issues  have  already  been  discussed  in  other  World  Bank  documents.y Another
approach,  which  is  the  one  considered  in this  paper,  is  to expand  the  role  of
the  private  sector  in the  production  of education.  Although  there  are  no
1/ For  general  discussions  of the  problem  of educational  quality  in
developing  countries,  see  World  Bank (1985),  Ch.  4; Psacharopoulos  and
Woodhall  (1985),  Ch.  8.
X/  There  is  now  an extensive  literature  on the  relationship  between
educational  policy  and  equity. For  general  surveys  see  Psacharopoulos  and
Woodhall  (1985),  Ch.  9; Fields  (1980;  Jimenez  (1986).
1  For  comprehensive  discussions  of  pricing  policies  and  cost  recovery  in
public  education,  see  Jimenez  (1987)  and  Psacharopoulos,  Tan,  and  Jimenez
(1986).private  institutions  of  higher  learning  in  most  developing  countries,  they  are
prevalent  in  some,  particularly  in  Asia  and  Latin  America. In these
countries,  their  role  and importance  -- ary  substantially. What lessons  can  be
learned  from  these  countries  regarding  the  role  of the  private  sector  in
higher  education? More importantly,  w1..t  types  of  government  policies  should
be used in  order  to  make the  operation  oi the  private-sector  subsystem
consistert  with the  social  objectives  for  the  post-secondary  education  system
as a  whole?
This  paper  discusses  these  issues  and  reviews  the  relevant
literature. It  is organized  as follows. In  Section  II,  we give  a brief
descriptive  overview  of the  role  of private-sector  post-secondary  education  in
developing  countries. In  Section  III,  we review  various  factors  that
influence  demand  and  supply  in  a system  of  private  higher  education,  and
discuss  different  ways in  which  a  system  driven  by private  demand  and  supply
may  conflict  with the  goals  of soci'.cy  as  a whole  in the  post-secondary
education  area.  This  discussio-,  serves  to  pinpoint  a number  of areas  where
there  is  a prima  facie  case  for  government  intervention  to influence  the
operation  of the  private  higher  education  sector  (through  subsidies,  quality
regulation,  and  so  on).  Section  IV  discusses  policy  issues  when  private
education  does  exist. In  this  context,  we do not  try  to derive  precise
prescriptions,  which  we believe  to  be country  specific. Rather,  we discuss
general  issues  that  are  relevant  when  forming  policy. Finally,  Section  V
contains  a  brief  summary.
II.  OVERVIEW  OF PRIVATE  HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
How  extensive  is  the  role  of the  private  sector  in  providing  higher
education  in  developing  countries?  Although  systematic  data  are  unavailable,
this  section  presents  a summary  of available  information  in  a selected  group
of  countries  in  East  Asia and  Latin  America. It is  based  on a review  of
published  or  unpublished  works  dealing  with  the  functioning  of higher-3-
education  systems  in  developing  countries,  and  on  World  Bank  staff  appraisal
reports  for  projects  relating  to  higher  educationY
To differentiate  between  public  and  private  higher  education
institutions  we use  UNESCO's  definitions.  A  public  sector  educational
institution  is  defined  as:  "...  a school  operated  by a  public  authority
(national,  federal,  state  or  provincial,  or local)  whatever  the  origin  of the
resources."  A private  school  is  defined  as:  "...  a school  not  operated  by a
public  authority,  whether  or  not it  receives  financial  support  from  such
authorities.  Private  schools  may  be defined  as aided  or  non-aided,
respectively,  according  as they  derive  or do not  derive  financial  support  from
public  authorities."  "Higher  education"  is  used  to  refer  to  universities  and
equivalent  institutes  with  programs  leading  to a  bachelor's  or  graduate
degree. This  excludes  colleges  and  certain  post-secondary  institutions  below
the  university  level.
Data  about  student  enrollment  in  private  and  publ!c  institutions
providing  higher  education  in  a  group  of twenty  Latin  American  countries,  and
from  a select  group  of  five  Asian  countries  (Indonesia,  Korea,  Philippines,
Malaysia,  and  Thailand)  are  presented  in  Table  1  and  2 respectively.  The  data
show  a  very  mixed  pattern  in terms  of the  private-public  composition  of total
enrollment,  and  in the  relative  growth  rates  of the  two  subsectors.
In  the  case  of the  Latin  American  countries  included  in  the  sample,
there  is  a clear  trend  toward  a growing  importance  of the  share  of  private
institutions.  Enrollment  in  private  universities  has  grown  especially  rapidly
since  the  mid-1960s,  increasing  from  around  20%  to  abouit  one-third  of the
total  enrollment  at the  end  of the  1970s  and  the  beginning  of the  1980s.
V  This  section  is  based  on an  unpublished  working  paper  prepared  by Ruben  M.
Suarez-Berenguela  for  the  World  Bank  Education  and  Training  Department,
January  1987. Among  the  published  works,  the  book  by Levy  on private  higher
education  in  Latin  America  stands  out.-4-
Table  1
Enrollment  in  Private  Post-secondary  Institutions
in Latin  America  (Percent  of total  enrollment)
Latin  America  Excluding  Brazil
1955  14.2  7.3
1960  15.4  9.2
1965  20.0  14.7
1970  29.6  19.6
1975  33.7  19.1
Source: Based  on Levy (1986)
Even  excluding  Brazil,  the  country  with the  largest  population  and
largest  proportion  of students  enrolled  in  private  sector  institutions,  a
general  trend  toward  a  greater  role  for  private  institutions  is  apparent. In
Colombia  in 1981,  enrollment  in  private  universities  accounted  for
approximately  60%  of the  total  enrollment  in  universities  and  equivalent
institutes.  Around  1980  the  share  of student  enrollment  in  private
universities  represented  39%  in  Chile,  and  around  30%  ir  Paraguay  and  Peru.
However,  in  other  Latin  American  countries  the  private  sector  shares  are
lower: in  Cuba,  Bolivia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  and  Uruguay,  enrollment  in
private  sector  institutions  is less  than  5%  of the  total  enrollment.
Among  the  Asian  countries  in the  sample  (Table  2),  there  are  three
in  which  enrollment  in  private  higher  education  institutions  represents  more
than  50%  of the  total: Indonesia,  Korea,  and  the  Philippines.  On the  other
hand,  in  Malaysia  and  Thailand  the  share  of  private  enrollment  is less  than
25%. In  Malaysia  in  1984  approximately  50%  of the  enrollment  in  post-
secondary  institutions  was in  universities  and  equivalent  institutes.
Enrollment  in  private-sector  institutions  represented  only  around  23%  of the
total  in this  type  of  higher  education  institutions.  In the  case  of Thailand,
enrollment  in  private  sector  institutions  represented  around  4.1%  of the
registered  enrollment  in  higher  education  institutions  under  the  supervision
of the  Ministry  of  University  Affairs. However,  it is  not  clear  from  the-5-
sources whether or not the data incluee students  enrolled in "open
universities."  Thus, the estimate for this case may be misleading as well,
sin-ee  a large proportion of post-secondary enrollment is in open universities.
Table 2
Asian Countries, Share of Private Institutions in
Total Enrollment
Private enrollment
Country  Year  Type of Institutions  as % of the total
Indonesia  1982  HEI  52.9
Korea  1983  HES  75.0
Philippines  1975  HE  90.1
Malaysia  1984  Univ. & Equiv. Inst.*  22.9
Thailand  1982  HPEI-MUA  4.1
HEI:  Higher education institutions,  including tertiary institutions:
universities, colleges, academies and institutes.
HES:  Higher education sector:  junior colleges, university colleges,
and post graduate  programs.
HE:  Higher education institutions seem to refer to universities and
equivalent institutes.
(*)  Approximately 50 percent of the enrollment in post-secondary
highereducation institutions.
HEI-MUA:  Higher education institutions  under the supervision of the
Ministry of University Affairs (MUA).  Private or Public nature
of "open"  universities is not well defined.
Sources:  Based on data from various World Bank reports.
Table 3 summarizes the trends and actual shares of enrollment in
private higher education institutions in the Latin American and Asian
countries discussed above.- 6  -
Table  3
Trends  and/or  Actual  Share  of Enrollment  in  Private  Higher
Education  Institutions.  Selected  developing  countries
(circa  1980)
Non-existent,  More than  10%  More than  50%
Minor  and/or  but less  than  50%  Growing  of total
not growing  Not growing  Rapidly  enrollment
Cuba,  Bolivia,  Chile,  Argentina,  Indonesia,
Nicaragua,  Mexico,  Ecuador,  Colombia,  Korea,
Panama,  Venezuela  Dominican  Republic,  Philippines,
Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  Peru,  Brazil,
Haiti,  Indonesia  Colombia
Honduras,
Uruguay,
Sources: Same  as for  Tables  1, 2
Table  4 presents  information  on the  fields  of specializatior  offered
by public  and  private  institutions  in  selected  Latin  American  countries.  As
the  Table  indicates,  private  universities  in these  countries  tend  to
specialize  in  offering  degrees  in the  areas  of economics,  business
administration,  and  humanities.  Public  institutions,  on the  other  hand,  tend
to specialize  in fields  where  education  is relatively  more  expensive,  such  as
those  that  re,uire  many  years  of schooling,  and  more investment  in  capital
equipment. Examples  are  medicine,  natural  ("exact")  sciences,  and
engineering.
More detailed  data  on enrollment  by fields  of specialization  in
Latin  American  universities  are,  by and  large,  consistent  with  the  picture
provided  by Table  4.  Student  enrollment  in  medicine,  engineering,  and  natural
sciences  is a  considerably  higher  proportion  of total  enrollment  in  public
than  in  private  universities.  Within  private  universities,  a large  proportion
of students  are  enrolled  in the  humanities,  and in  commercial,  social  and
behavioral  sciences  programmes.-7-
Table  4
Enrollment  by Field  of Specialization  Selected  Countries
Percent  of Total  Enrollment,  Private/Public  Universities
Com.  Hum.  Law  Med.  Sci./Eng.
Bolivia  58/10  12/2  0/8  0/21  0/38
Colombie  37/10  5/7  16/4  4/9  21/38
Ecuador  23/18  9/6  6/6  1/11  11/22
Mexico  35/20  1/2  6/9  20/20  18/28
Peru  47/23  7/0  5/4  1/7  14/33
"Comr.":  Economics,  Business  Administration  and  Communications
"Hum.": Humanities
"Law"  :  Law
"Med.": Medicine
"Sci./Eng.":  Exact  sciences  and  Engineering
Ill.  THE  ROLE  OF  GOVERNMENT  IN  PRIVATE  HIGHER  EDUCATION
Social  goals  for  the  educational  system  may  be defined  in  somewhat
different  ways.  To  what  extent  can  we expect  a  private  system  of post-
secondary  education  to  operate  in  a  way that  is consistent  with these  social
goals? In  other  words,  would  an  unregulated  and  unsubsidized  system  of
private  higher  education  automatically  be efficient,  that  is,  provide  the
right  kinds  of educational  services  (in  terms  of  both  quantity  and  quality)?
Would  it  operate  in a  way  consistent  with society's  equity  objectives?
With  respect  to efficiency,  government  intervention  is  needed  when
there  is  a conflict  between  the  private  profitability,  and  the  profitability
from  the  viewpoint  of  society  as a  whole,  of investments  in  higher
J  See  James  (1986a).education./ Such  a conflict  can  arise  for  a number  of reasons  on both  the
demand  and  supply  side. Many of these  issues  are  discussed  in  an earlier
paper  (Blomqvist  1986)  and  are  only  summarized  here.
A.  Imperfections  on the  Demand  Side
Externalities.  imDerfect.  credit  markets.  and  risk. These
characteristics  cause  social  and  private  returns  to  diverge. Positive
externalities  arise  when  a graduate's  contribution  to  national  well-being  is
greater  than  his/her  wage.  The  conclusion  that  this  was  the  case  appeared
especially  warranted  in  newly  independent  countries  of the  1960s  where  the
departure  of many  expatriate  educated  workers  had  exacerbated  the  shortage  of
such  manpower.Y Moreover,  a large  proportion  of  manpower  with  higher
education  was  employed  in  the  public  sector. Therefore,  its  contribution  to
national  income  took  the  form  of government  administrative  services  and  other
"public  goods"  which  are  necessary  for  a society  to  function,  but  which  are
not  bought  and  sold  in the  market  and  therefore  cannot  be given  a very  precise
monetary  value.
The implicit  discount  rate  used  by prospective  ctudents  and  their
families  in  comparing  the  cost  of  an education  today  with  the  prospects  of
increased  future  earnings,  may  not  be the  same  as the  social  discount  rate.
Decisions  in  the  area  of education  and  career  choice  require  forecasting  far
into  the  future. Since  the  degree  of  uncertainty  associated  with  predicting
the  future  is  likely  to increase  with  the  time  herizon  involved,  this  means
that  such  investment  choices  will  be  perceived  as  risky,  especially  in  fields
V  A set  of international  estimates  of  both  private  and  social  rates  of
return  to  education  at all  levels  is  provided  in Psacharopoulos  (1981).
Psacharopoulos  (1982)  focuses  on the  returns  to  post-secondary  education  in
particular.
Y  The  excerpts  from  two  early  essays  by Harbison  in  Meier's  anthology  of
readings  in development  economics  (Harbison,  1984)  represent  a clear  statement
of the  view that  emphasizes  the  critical  importance  of  highly  educated
manpower  for  the  development  process.- 9  -
where  the  human  capital  acquired  during  training  is  very  specific.!/  Thus
risk-averse  students  (or  students  from  risk-averse  families)  may  be reluctant
to  finance  education  even  if it  has a  high  ex.pected  value  from  society's  point
of view:  this  is  the  equivalent  of  students'  using  a  higher  discount  rate  in
their  private  profitability  calculation  than  would  be appropriate  from
society's  point  of  view.
Even  when  students  are  willing  to take  the  risk,  they  may  find  it
difficult  to  raise  the  necessary  funds. Since  human  capital  cannot  be used  as
collateral  for  a loan,  lenders  are  likely  to  be more  reluctant  to  lend  for
human  capital  formation.  Also,  a student's  success  in  school  cannot  be
perfectly  predicted,  thus  dissuading  risk-averse  individuals  from  particular
types  of  human  capital  investment,  even  thcse  that  have a  high  social  value.
The  factors  discussed  above  would  all  tend  to  make  social  profitability  exceed
private,  and  hence  lead  to  a general  tendency  to  underinvestment  in post-
secondary  education  in the  absence  of government  intervention.
Education  and  heterogeneity  of individual  ability.  The
interdependence  between  individual  abilities  and  the  prospective  return  to
education  is  likely  to  create  complications  for  the  design  of policy  toward
private  higher  education,  especially  if  we recognize  that  an individual's
personal  characteristics  are  known  only  imperfectly,  and  can  sometimes  only  be
ascertained  at  high  cost  and  over  a long  period  of time. Suppose  it is true
that  many  of the  skills  and  abilities  that  explain  the  superior  productivity
and  higher  incomes  of educated  individuals  in  particular  jobs  are  Innate,
rather  than  acquired  through  education.  This  does  not  necessarily  mean that
education  is  a  waste  from  the  individual's  point  of  view.  For  one  thing,
education  may contribute  to the  student's  ability  to identify  the  particular
!  The  problems  caused  by the  long  time  horizon  in  educational  investments
are  emphasized  in  Musgrave  (1966)  and  Harbison  (1984).
2/ The  empirical  and  theoretical  problems  that  arise  for  human  capital  theory
when  individual  heterogeneity  is  recognized,  are  stressed  in  Blaug  (1976);  see
also  the  survey  in Blomqvist  (1986).- 10  -
job  for  which  his  or  her particular  characteristics  would  be best suited,  if
jobs are heterogenous  as  well as individuals.  Or, the diploma and other
evidence  of performance  the  individual  obtained  in the  educational  system
maybe  interpreted  by employers  as evidence  of the  person's  superior  ability
for  a given  job,  and  therefore  make  them  willing  to  offer  the  person  a  higher
wage.  In  wither  case,  education  would  have  had  a payoff  to the  individual,
even  though  it  might  not in  itself  have  created  most  of the  individual's
productive  skills: the  production  of information  about  individual
characteristics  would  still  mean that  there  would  be a private  demand  for
education  even if  no skills  were  acquired  through  it.
In  either  of these  two  examples,  the  idea  that  it is  costly  and
difficult  to  get  inform&tion  about  individual  characteristics  in  other  ways
than  through  education,  is  central  to  the  argument. If it  were  possible  to
accurately  measure  individual's  abilities  through  a simple  test,  or if  they
could  be accurately  ascertained  by employers  on the  basis  of a short  period  of
probationary  employment,  there  would  be no need  to  use  the  educational  system
as a  way  of measuring  these  abilities.  However,  if  reliable  testing  methods
are  not  available,  and  costs  of labor  turnover  are  high  so that  probationary
employment  is  a costly  measurement  method,  then  the  formal  education  system
may substitute  for  these  other  methods  as a  mechanism  for  producing  this
information.  Because  the  information  is  valuable  to  employers,  individuals
who  have  had their  abilities  certified  through  the  educational  system  could
generate  better  wage  offers  in the  labor  market,  so that  education  would
continue  to be privately  profitable.
However,  even though  there  would  continue  to  be a demand  for
education  because  of its  private  profitability,  the  economy  as a  whole  might
derive  little  or  no benefits  since  individuals'  productivity  would  (by
hypothesis)  depend  only  on  pre-existing  abilities  that  would  be present  even
without  education. This  type  of divergence  between  social  and  private
profitability  is the  central  one  in  the  so-called  "screening"  or "signalling"- 11  -
approach  to the  economic  analysis  of  education  that  emerged  in  the  1970s  as an
alternative  to the  human  capital  approach.12/
Graduate  unemployment.  credentialism.  and  the  demand  for  higher
education. In  many  developing  countries,  the  rapid  expansion  of  post-
secondary  education  in  recent  years  has  been accompanied  by a growing  problem
of  unemployment  of the  graduates  of  post-secondary  institutions.  Furthermore,
there  has also  been  considerable  evidence  in  many  places  of so-called
"credentialism";  that  is,  a tendency  toward  increases  in  the  minimum
educational  qualifications  for  particular  jobs  so that,  for  example,  a
university  degree  is  now  required  for  jobs  previously  filled  by secondary
school  graduates.WV  Finally,  there  have  been  suggestions  that  in some
countries  there  is "hidden  unemployment"  of post-secondary  graduates,  as a
result  of government  employment  of graduates  in  unproductive  jobs  created
primarily  for  the  purpose  of  alleviating  the  problem  of graduate
unemployment.DL
Phenomena  such  as credentialism  and  graduate  unemployment  are
indicative  of inflexibilities  in the  markets  for  educated  labor. Such
inflexibilities  in  turn  suggest  that  there  may  be a divergence  between  the
private  profitability  of  education  and  its  productivity  from  the  viewpoint  of
society  as  a whole. Again,  this  would  suggest  that  an unregulated  private
education  system  might  expand  more  than  would  be in  society's  interest,
calling  for  restrictive  policies.
Lo  Early  contributors  to this  literature  were  Arrow  (1973)  and  Spence  (1973).
For  a further  review  see  Blomqvist  (1986).
WU Dore (1976)  presents  an extensive  discussion  of the  credentialism
phenomenon.  A careful  analysis  of its  economic  effects  is contained  in
Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  (1977).
DJ'  Blomqvist  (1982)  analyzes  a  model  in  which  the  government  is assumed  to
act  as the  residual  employer  of educated  labor.- 12  -
Private  demand  and  the  guality  of education. Is  there  a tendency
for  the  private  and  social  benefits  of educational  quality  to differ?
The significance  of the  quality  dimension  differs  substantially
depending  on whether  education  is  regarded  as a process  of  human  capital
accumulation,  or as a  process  whose  primary  purpose  is to  generate  information
about  inherent  individual  characteristics.  Consider  first  the  case  where
education  .s seen  primarily  as  human  capital  accumulation.  There  may  be
differences  between  students  in  terms  of the  quality-cost  combination  they
prefer. For  example,  the  value  of  additional  institutional  inputs  (such  as
instruction  time),  in  terms  of improved  performance  and  future  productivity,
may  be higher  for  students  with  greater  ability. If this  is so,  there  may  be
a systematic  tendency  for  inherently  better  students  to  gravitate  toward  high-
quality  institutions,  and  vice  versa. Moreover,  students  learn  from  each
other. Other  things  equal,  this  may  reinforce  the  tendency  for  students  to
naturally  get  sorted  into  institutions  according  to their  differential
ability. Such  an outcome--that  there  is  a range  of institutions  offering
educational  services  of different  degrees  of  quality  and  cost--may  be
economically  efficient.
When  education  is  seen  primar-ly  as providing  information  about  pre-
existing  abilities,  the  valuation  of the  inputs  provided  by the  institution
does  not  depend  on the  productivity  of these  inputs  in  creating  human  capital.
Instead,  their  value  (from  the  student's  point  of  view)  depends  on their
contribution  to the  institution's  reputation  as a "screen". Factors  such  as
student-teacher  ratios,  the  qualifications  of the  instructors,  etc.,  will,
presumably,  improve  the  accuracy  of the  screening  process  (the  signal). At
the  same  time,  an institution  that  provides  large  amounts  of inputs  into  the
education  process  (e.g.,  by maintaining  a low  student-teacher  ratio)  may
suffer: it  may lead  to an interpretation  of its  students'  performance  as
being  due  to the  high  quality  of the  school's  inputs,  rather  than  to  the
inherent  ability  of the  students.- 13 -
The  question  of what  is  appropriate  government  policy  with  respect
to quality  regulation  becomes  quite  complicated  in  this  case.  Since  the
private  benefit  of resources  spent  on screening  is  likely  to  be considerably
greater  than  the  social  benefit,  the  object  of  policy  should  be to  reduce  the
amount  of resources  spent  on  education. It is  possible  that  quality
regulation  can  accomplish  this,  as discussed  below.
B.  ImDerfections  on the  Supply  Side
In order  for  a system  of  private  higher  education  to  function
efficiently,  the  private  cost  of education  must  be close  to its  cost  to
society  as a  whole. Thus,  the  prices  (tuition  fees)  at  which  educational
services  are  offered  must  reflect  the  opportunity  cost  of the  resources  being
used to  produce  them. This  requires  both that  these  prices  reflect  the  cost
of  production,  and  that  educational  services  are  produced  efficiently,  at the
least  possible  cost. There  are  various  reasons  why these  conditions  may  not
be met.
Competition  and  economies  of scale. If there  are  many  different
institutions  in  the  market,  and  free  entry  of new  ones,  there  will  be
competition  in  the  system,  both for  students  and  for  teachers. Competition
for  students  would  tend  to  reduce  the  tuition  fees  being  charged;  it  might
also  take  the  form  of raising  the  quality  of the  education  being  offered  at
given  fees. In either  case,  excess  profits  (over  and  above  a  normal  rate  of
return  on invested  capital)  would  tend  to disappear.
However,  there  are  a  number  of factors  that  may  significantly  weaken
competition  among  private  post-secondary  institutions.  In  some  cases  there
may  be formal  or informal  collusive  agreements  regarding  pricing,  etc. In
other  cases,  government  regulations  on pricing,  quality  standards,  and
admissions  criteria  may indirectly  have  the  same  effect.
A particularly  important  issue  in this  context  is  whether  there  are
substantial  economies  of scale  in  the  provision  of post-secondary  education.- 14 -
Substantial  economies  of scale  may act  as an effective  barrier  to entry  of new
institutions,  especially  in  an economy  with  highly  imperfect  capital  markets,
and  this  would  render  the  system  less  competitive.  While  there  has  been some
empirical  work  on the  economies-of-scale  issue  for  education  at the  primary
and  secondary  levels,  less  is  known  about  post-secondary  education  in this
regard,  particularly  because  there  are  multiple  outputs. However,  the
aggregative  evidence  that  does  exist,  points  to the  conclusion  that  for  higher
education  as a  whole,  there  may  be substantial  economies  of scale,
particularly  for  technical  fields.Wi
Research-teaching  interaction.  Another  factor  that  complicates
analysis  of the  cost  of  providing  higher  education  is the  interaction  between
the  teaching  and  research  functions  at some  post-secondary  institutions.  The
demand  for  research  is largely  a demand  that  stems,  directly  or indirectly,
from  the  public  sector,  and  it is  likely  that  the  bulk  of that  demand  will  be
channeled  to  public-sector  institutions.  For  this  reason,  most  private
institutions  in  developing  countries  will  be primarily  oriented  toward
teaching. As we  will  discuss  in  more  detail  below,  the  policy  case  for
delegating  a significant  part  of the  research  function  of  higher  education  to
the  private  sector  is  considerably  less  strong  than  the  case  for  delegation  of
the  teaching  function.
Problems  of  monitoring  guality. The  difficulty  of assessing  quality
has an important  influence  on the  competitive  process,  and  on the  supply  of
educational  services  from  a private  system. For  one  thing,  it is likely  to
imply  a tendency  for  private  for-profit  institutions  to  supply  educational
services  of lower  quality  than  would  be efficient.  At the  same  time,  the
difficulty  of quality  assessment  can  be thought  of  as indirectly  creating  an
entry  barrier  for  institutions  seeking  to  provide  high-quality  education. In
order  for  it to  be profitable  to  offer  high  quality,  an institution  must
W1/  A thorough  review  of the  general  economies-of-scale  issue  is  given  in
Psacharopoulos  and  Woodhall  (1985),  Ch.  7.  Psacharopoulos  (1982)  presents
some  macro-level  evidence  relating  to the  post-secondary  level;  his  conclusion
is that  there  are  substantial  economies  of scale  in  post-secondary  education.- 15  -
acquire  a reRutation  for  high quality,  so that  prospective  students  will  be
willing  to  pay  for  the  inputs  necessary  to  provide  it.  But  building  up such  a
reputation  may  be a long  and  costly  process,  and  the  large  amount  of funds
necessary  to  finance  this  proces3  will  act  as  an additional  entry  barrier. As
we will  discuss  below,  the  governmrnt  may  play  a useftul  role  through  policy
measures  that  indirectly  reduce  this  barrier.
The  role  of  non-profit  tnstitutions.  The  economic  behavior  of non-
profit  institutions  may  be similtr  to  that  of  for-profit  institutions  in  many
ways.W  For  example,  a religious  organization  that  operates  a post-secondary
institution  in  order  to  expose  students  to  their  religion,  presumably  has  the
same  incentive  as the  owners  of a for-profit  institution  to  produce  its
educational  services  at  minimum  cost. In some  cases,  non-profit  institutions
may contain  individuals  (for  example,  the  president  or the  faculty)  who  are
able  to  claim  at least  a share  of any  residual  "profits"  as bonuses,  salary
increases,  or perquisites  such  as subsidized  housing,  etc.WM If these
individuals  have  substantial  control  over  the  decisions  governing  the
institution,  they  are  likely  to  behave  similarly  to  profit-seeking  owners.
In  other  respects,  however,  non-profit  institutions  might  behave
differently  from  profit-seeking  ones  even  as  producers  of conventional
education  services. For  example,  the  non-economic  objectives  of religion-
based  non-profit  institutions  may  lead  them  to  concentrate  on  high-quality
education  to  elite  students. Depending  on their  objectives,  non-profit
institutions  may  also  choose  to subsidize  the  cost  to the  students  they
educate,  in the  form  of  either  a subsidy  to quality  or  quantity,  depending  on
the  organization's  objectives. Such  subsidies  would  generally  be available
only  to  a limited  number  of students.
IV  Non-profit  educational  institutions  are  extensively  discussed  in  James
(1986a,  b).  For  a  general  discussion  of the  non-profit  organizational  form,
see  James  (1987)  and  James  and  Ackerman  (1986).
ILs  James  (1986a)  suggests  that  this  is  especially  likely  to  be true  for  the
case  of secular  non-profit  organizations.- 16 -
A precise  analysis  of the  possible  role  of non-profit  organizations
in  providing  private  sector  higher  education  is  difficult. There  are  a large
number  of objectives  that  such  organizations  may  be interested  in  pursuing,
and  predictions  concerning  their  behavior  can  only  be made  if  one is  prepared
to  make  very  specific  assumptions  concerning  these  objectives.
C.  Private  Higher  Education  and  Eguitv
Most of the  preceding  discussion  of the  need  for  policy  intervention
in  private  higher  education  lhas  related  to  the  efficiency  objective. However,
in the  debate  over  post-secondary  education  policy  in  developing  countries,
the  equity  objective  probably  plays  at least  as important  a role  as
efficiency.
A major  reason  why governments  intervene  to improve  equity  is that
capital  markets  are  far  from  perfect: students  from  low-income  families  are
likely  to find  it  difficult  to  borrow  the  funds  necessary  to finance  the  full
cost  of  post-secondary  education. In  addition,  even  if they  were  able  to,
many  low-income  families  are  risk-averse  and  would  be more  reluctant  than
high-income  families  to take  the  risk  associated  with  financing  post-secondary
education  for  their  children. In the  absence  of offsetting  government  policy,
there  would  thus  be a strong  tendency  for  investment  in  higher  education  to  be
more  common  among  children  from  high-income  families.10  Thus,  government
policies  (such  as loan  guarantees)  to  counter  the  effects  of imperfections  in
the  capital  market  may improve  efficiency,  as  well  as equity.
W/ Even  with government  subsidies  to  facilitate  access  to higher  education
for  students  from  low-income  families,  students  from  high-income  families  are
disproportionately  represented  in  higher  education. Since  most  countries
subsidize  students  from  all  families,  the  result  is that  a large  share  of the
benefits  from  such  subsidy  schemes  tends  to  accrue  to  high-income  families.
For  a review  of the  evidence,  see  Jimenez  (1987),  Ch. 5.- 17 -
If  high-income  families  provide  a  better  environment  for  early
intellectual  development,  or are  better  able  to  afford  high-quality  secondary
school  training  for  their  children,  thereby  improving  their  ability  to  benefit
from  post-secondary  education,  then  a system  in  which  all  individuals  have
access  to the  services  of  post-secondary  institutions  on similar  terms  will
tend  to  reinforce  income  inequality.W!  Moreover,  differences  in individual
ability  in  combination  with  problems  such  as inadequate  access  by poor
families  to the  capital  market  may  give  rise  to  both inequity  and
inefficiency,  if it results  in a tendency  for  able  individuals  from  poor
families  to  not  invest  in  post-secondary  education  while  less  able  ones  from
better-off  families  do.)! Policies  to improve  access  to  higher  education  for
able  students  from  poor families  would  tend  to improve  both equity  and
efficiency.  On the  other  hand,  other  government  policies  aimed  at  promoti.g
equity  may  give  rise  to  a conflict  between  equity  and  efficiency.  For
example,  a policy  of  preferential  subsidies  to facilitate  access  by all
students  from  low-income  families  may,  on  average,  cause  resources  to  be
diverted  to the  education  of individuals  with  relatively  low  ability. This
might  mean that  productivity  (from  the  viewpoint  of society  as a  whole)  would
be increased  by less  than  if  the  same  resources  had  been  used  for  education  of
individuals  with  relatively  higher  ability. Or consider  the  case  of Job
allocation  by educational  credentials.  Equity-promoting  policies  intended  to
facilitate  access  by low-income  students  to  post-secondary  education  (thus
increasing  their  chances  of  being  allocated  to a  high-paying  job)  could
exacerbate  the  resource  waste  inherent  in this  type  of credentialism.
IV  Psacharopoulos  and  Woodhall  (1985),  Ch.  9,  provide  a brief  review  of the
evidence  concerning  the  effects  of educational  expansion  and income
inequality,  and find  that  it is  mixed.  in  some  countries,  improved
accessibility  to education  appears  to  have  been  associated  with increased
inequality.
W  Jimenez  and  Tan (1987)  report  such  a tendency  in  Colombian  data.- 18 -
IV.  POLICIES  TOWARD  PRIVATE  HIGHER  EDUCATION
This section  discusses  the  implications  of the  preceding  analysis
for  practical  policymaking.  The  policy  measures  fall  into  two  broad
categories.  The first  consists  of  measures  affecting  the  financing  of  private
higher  education,  while  the  second  relates  to  various  forms  of government
monitoring  and  regulation  of post-secondary  education. The  discussion  does
not  derive  specific  prescriptions;  instead,  it  reviews  issues  that  should  be
considered  when forming  policy  in  specific  situations.
As argued  above,  the  productivity  of the  post-secondary  education
system  depends  crucially  on the  effectiveness  with  which  the  economy  can  make
use  of the  graduates  from  the  system. Therefore,  we also  briefly  consider
policies  to enhance  the  functioning  of  the  labor  markets  for  graduates.
One important  issue  that  is  not  discussed  in  detail  is  what  the
relative  role  of public  and  private  institutions  should  be.  This  is  partly  a
question  of relative  cost-effectiveness.  Case  study  evidence  suggests  that
there  generally  is  a tendency  for  private-sector  institutions  to  have  lower
average  costs-per-student  than  public-sector  ones. 1 2 However,  this  does  not
take  into  account  the  differences  between  the  two  sectors  in  terms  of the  mix
of fields  of specialization  offered,  nor  possible  differences  in the  quality
of educational  services. Clearly,  further  research  :.s  needed  on this  issue.L 2
IV  James (1986b).
.U For  an interesting  attempt  at comparing  educational  efficiency  of public
and  private  institutions  at the  secondary  level,  see  Jimenez,  Paqueo,  and  de
Vera (1987). In their  comparison  they  sidestep  the  problem  of output
heterogeneity  by focusing  on student  achievement  in three  relatively  narrowly
defined  subjects  (Mathematics,  English,  and  Filipino).  They  also  refine  their
output  measure  by correcting  for  the  effect  of student  background. The
problems  with quality  measurement  are  further  discussed  below.- 19  -
A.  Financial  Rolicies  towards  orivate  institutions
This  subsection  discusses  current  trends  in  financing. It  then
presents  pros  and  cons  of alternative  financing  policy  options.
Financing  Ratterns: government  transfers  and  fees. Levy's  (1986)
analysis  of the  evolution  of private  higher  education  in  Latin  America
classifies  private  institutions  into  two  categories  with  respect  to financing:
private  institutions  receiving  direct  government  transfers  and/or  subsidies,
and  private  institutions  for  which  the  main  or only  source  of revenue  is
students'  tuition  and  fees.
In general,  with  the  exception  of Chile,  the  class  of  private
universities  receiving  transfers  from  the  government  includes  only  a small
number  of "elite"  universities,  with  a  relatively  small  number  of students,
stringent  admission  requirements  and  high  tuition  and  fees. Several  of the
catholic  universities  and  a small  number  of non-denominational  universities
would  be classified  in this  group.
Among  the  self-financed  universities,  a further  distinction  can  be
made  between  small  "elite"  private  universities,  with  relatively  high  tuition
and  fees,  and  a large  number  of less  expensive  "demand  absorbing"  private
universities,  with  a large  number  of students,  and  relatively  lenient
admission  requirements.  Most  of these  "demand  absorbing"  universities  are
technically  organized  as  non-profit  institutions,  but  have  full  cost  recovery
in  the  sense  that  their  only  source  of revenue  is tuition  and  fees. While  the
quality  of  education  in the  self-financed  "elite"  private  universities  might
be compared  with  that  of the  government-sponsored  universities,  the  qualitv  in
the  "demand  absorbing"  private  universities  is  often  perceilted  as lower.
Table  5 presents  a summary  of the  financing  structure  of a group  of
61  private  and 130  public  Latin  American  universities.  "Own  Income,"  which
consists  mostly  of students'  fees,  represents  the  main source  of financing  for
private  universities,  accounting  for  approximately  two-thirds  of their  total- 20 -
income. Government  contributions  represent  a little  more  than  one-fourth  of
total  revenue  for  private  institutions.  For  public  institutions,  on the  other
hand,  Own  Income  was  no  more than  about  6%,  while  government  funds  contributed
about  90%.
Table  5
Sources  of  Finance  in  Latin  American  Universities
(Percent  of total  revenue)
Private  Own
Sector  State  Donors  Income  Other
Private  27.9  0.6  62.8  8.7
Public  87.3  2.3  6.4  4.0
Total  79.9  2.0  13.4  4.7
Source: Levy  (1986)  p. 222
The  financing  pattern  in  individual  countries  may  differ
substantially  from  the  average  pattern  in  Table  5, and  may  also  change  over
time. The  private  sector  in  Chile  relied,  until  the  mid-1970s,  to a large
extent  on transfers  from  the  central  government.  Since  the  mid-1970s,  on the
other  hand,  both  public  and  private  institutions  have  been  forced  to  rely  more
on  private  contributions  and  student  fees. In the  case  of  Mexico,  financing
of  private  universities  comes  entirely  from  private  sources  (fees  and  private
contributions),  with  no direct  transfer  of financial  resources  from  the  state;
a similar  pattern  is observed  in  Argentina,  Panama,  and  Venezuela. In  the
case  of  Brazil,  state  aid  to  private  institutions  is for  the  development  of
plant  facilities  and  research  at post-graduate  educational  levels;  there  is  no
government  finance  for  basic  undergraduate  education.
In  Latin  American  countries  where  the  government  does  contribute
financial  support  to  private  institutions,  this  support  has  been  going  mostly
to catholic  universities.  This  has  been  the  case  in Peru,  Ecuador,  and  some
Central  American  and  Caribbean  countries. In the  case  of Peru  during  the
early  1970s,  state  contributions  to  the  catholic  university  represented  more- 21 -
than  50%  of the  university  budget. In Ecuador  government  transfers  to the
catholic  university  represented  around  30%  of the  university  budget.
On the  other  hand,  few  of the  secular  or  non-catholic  private
universities  in  various  countries  receive  transfers  from  the  state;  for  most
of these  institutions  fees  and  private  contributions  represent  almost  the  only
source  of financing. This  pattern  of government  intervention  in  the  financing
of private  institutions  seems  to  be more  the  result  of the  historical  relation
between  the  state  and  the  church  in  Latin  America  rather  than  a deliberate
policy  with  respect  to the  financing  of private  institutions.
Data  about  financing  patterns  of  private  institutions  for  the  Asian
countries  are  more  scattered  and  incomplete  than  for  Latin  America. Table  6
summarizes  some  of the  qualitative  information  that  is  available. Most  of the
financing  for  the  private  institutions  comes  from  tuition  fees  set  on a full-
cost  recovery  basis. Government  transfers  of financial  resources  to  private
universities  are  minimal. Tuition  and  fees  in  private  higher  education
institutions  in the  Philippines,  Malaysia,  and  Thailand  represent  more  than
80%  of the  budgets  of these  institutions.  In the  Korean  case,  an important
part  of the  revenue  of  both  private  and  public  universities  comes  from  student
fees. Fees  in  private  universities  are  from  40 to  70%  higher  than  the  fee
charged  in  public  institutions.  With the  exception  of  Korea,  public
institution  tuition  fees  in the  Asian  countries  in  the  sample  are  nominal  and
account  for  only  a small  proportion  of the  budgets  of these  institutions.
Revenue  from  sources  other  than  government  transfers  and  fees,  a  minor  source
of income,  include  items  such  as income  from  endowments,  private  business
sector  contributions,  contributions  from  private  individuals  and  alumni
associations,  from  local  governments,  citizen  associations,  etc.- 22 -
Table  6
Sources  of Finance  in  Private  Higher  Education
Institutions  in  Selected  Asian  Countries
Country  Year  State  Transfers  Tuition  & Fees
Indonesia  1983/84  Only  for  development  Norm:  Full-cost
("seed"  money)  recovery
Korea  1983  Several  government  Generally,  fees  are
supported  institutions 40  to  70%  above
those  of public
institutions
Philippines  1980  Minor  Almost  all  funding,
9/10  of students  pay
full-cost  fees.
Malaysia  1984  Less  than  6% of the  80%  of the  budget
budget
Thailand  1980  Small  proportion  Approx.  93%  of the
revenues
Sources: Based  on information  in  World  Bank  reports.
The  fundamental  question  facing  government  decisionmakers  with
respect  to the  funding  of  higher  education  is the  extent  to  which  the  private
cost  of education  should  be subsidized.  As discussed  previously,  the  answer
may  be important  both  from  the  viewpoints  of  efficiency  and  equity. While  the
focus  here  is  on subsidies  to  private-sector  education,  the  issues  that  arise
with respect  to the  subsidization  of the  private  cost  of education  in  public-
sector  institutions  are  similar  in  many  respects.
Subsidizing  Rrivate  higher  education. Large  general  subsidies  to
students  in  private  higher  education--that  is,  subsidies  regardless  of
student's  academic  discipline,  need,  and  ability--will  likely  improve  neither
efficiency  nor  equity. The  extent  of externalities  that  may  justify  subsidies- 23 -
depend  upon the  discipline  involved  and  labor  market  conditions.  Screening,
wage  rigidities  creating  graduate  unemployment,  or "job  rationing"  through
credentialism,  cause  more  resources  to  be devoted  to  education  than  would  be
efficient,  even  if there  were  no subsidies.  The  effect  of subsidizing
education  in  areas  affected  by this  would  be to  exacerbate  the  problem,  since
it  would  further  raise  the  private  profitability.  General  subsidies  to
private  educatio,n  justified  by equity  considerations  might,  in this  situation,
seriously  conflict  with the  efficiency  objective. Put  differently,  subsidies
to  higher  education  would  be an exceptionally  costly  method  for  redistributing
income  to low-income  people.W  Also,  as previously  disv.ussed,  there  is
evidence  from  many  countries  that  general  subsidies  to  higher  education  will,
in  fact,  be regressive  rathnez  than  progressive.  In tnis  situaticn,  such
subsidies  may thus  be counterproductive  from  the  point  of view  of  both  equity
and  efficiency.
Some  caveats  should  be emphasized  however. First,  while  the
suggestion  that  factors  such  as screening  and  credentialism  cause  private
profitability  to  exceed  social  in  many  countries  sounds  plausible,  systematic
evidence  supporting  it  is still  scarce.Y  Further  empirical  work on this
issue  in the  context  of  post-secondary  education  would  therefore  appear  to  be
a  high  priority. Second,  when  social  profitability  is less  than  private,
there  is  a prima  facie  case  for  restricting  the  amount  of resources  flowing
into  higher  education. But  this  can  be done  through  direct  enrollment
restrictions,  and/or  restrictions  on  establishment  of  new  private-sector
LIJ  Similar  considerations  would  also  apply  to  public-sactor  higher  education:
attempts  to  expand  the  number  of  places  in the  public  system  in  response  to
private  demand  would  be inefficient,  especially  if the  private  demand  had  been
enhanced  by a policy  of implicit  subsidies  through  low  fees.
2  With  respect  to  primary  education,  existing  evidence  appears  on  balance  to
lend  more  support  to a  human-capital  interpretation  of education  than  to  a
screening  interpretation;  see  Jamison  and  Lau (1982);  Berry  (1980). Based  on
studies  of  the  evolution  of income  differentials  over  time  between  those  with
differing  amounts  of education,  and  of  public-private  pay  differentials,
Psacharopoulos  (1980b,  1983)  also  concludes  that  there  is  little  or  no support
for  the  screening  hvpothesis.- 24 -
institutions,  rather  than  through  a general  withdrawal  of subsidies. Thus  if
there  is a strong  case  for  subsidies  (especially  for  students  from  low-income
families)  on equity  grounds,  such  schemes  need  not  be incompatible  with
efficiency  if they  are  combined  with  other  measures  which  restrict  enrollment
expansion.
In cases  where  general  subsidies  to  higher  education  cannot  be
justified  on efficiency  grounds,  there  are  nevertheless  various  special  kinds
of subsidies  that  can  be used  to  promote  more  specialized  objectives. For
example,  while  general  subsidies  to  higher  education  may  be both inefficient
and  inequitable,  subsidy  schemes  specifically  targeted  on students  from  low-
income  families  may still  be appropriate.  Such  schemes  will  clearly  be more
consistent  with equity. Furthermore,  since  capital  market  imperfections  are
likely  to  have  a disproportionate  impact  on the  private  cost  of education  for
low-income  families,  subsidy  schemes  specifically  targeted  at such  families
are  less  likely  to  be inconsistent  with the  efficiency  objective. Finally,
subsidizing  poor  students  to attend  private  higher  institutions  will  mitigate
the  possibility  of  a segregated  system,  where  only  poor  able  students  attend
the  state-run  systems  while  the  rich  go to  private  schools.
In practice,  targeted  schemes  are  likely  to  involve  the  use  of
scholarships  or  various  kinds  of loan  subsidies  and  guarantees.  A drawback  of
such  programs  is  that  they  may  be complicated  and  costly  to administer.  For
example,  mechanisms  must  be designed  for  ascertaining  family  income,  and  for
getting  repayment  of loans. If  applicants  are  to  be screened  according  to
academic  ability,  reliable  methods  of testing  must  be devised. Nevertheless,
scholarships  and  loan  schemes  have  been  successfully  used  in  many  high-income
countries,  and  they  should  be given  serious  consideration  in developing
countries  as  well.L 3
/  The  case  of loan  schemes  is  discussed  in  Psacharopoulos  and  Woodhall
(1985),  Ch.  6 and  Ch.  9;  see  also  Jimenez  (1987),  Ch.  7.  For  an  extensive
review  of developing  countries'  experience  with  such  schemes,  see  Woodhall
(1983).- 25 -
Particular  kinds  of subsidies  can  also  be used  to encourage  quality
of  education  in  private  institutions,  in  circumstances  where  private  costs  of
quality  monitoring  are  high.  W  For  example,  if  academic  qualifications  of
instructors  are  an important  quality  determinant,  public  subsidies  for  private
institutions  that  use  qualified  teachers  may  be appropriate.  In this
situation  there  could  also  be a  case  for  a subsidy  to  students  seeking  to
acquire  the  qualifications  that  would  make them  effective  post-secondary
teachers  (including  training  in  foreign  countries).  However,  subsidies  to the
employing  institutions  have the  advantage  that  there  is  less  likelihood  thlat
the  subsidies  will  be "wasted"  in the  sense  that  those  receiving  post-graduate
training  will  obtain  non-academic  employment,  or employment  in foreign
countries.  When subsidies  to  students  (for  example,  for  foreign  training)  are
used,  bonding  schemes  can  be constructed  to reduce  this  leakage. Other
quality-enhancing  subsidies  may involve  textbooks  or  other  teaching  materials.
Public  subsidies  for  academic  research  may  also  be used  to
indirectly  subsidize  the  quality  of  private  higher  education. Because
research  output  to  a large  extent  has the  characteristics  of a public  good,  it
generally  has to  be  heavily  subsidized  in  any  case. However,  in  addition  to
yielding  knowledge  that  is  useful  in  itself,  research  activity  is  likely  to
have  other  benefits: instructors  with  experience  in  research  are  better
teachers  in  post-secondary  institutions.  Therefore,  the  possibility  that  some
of the  manpower  trained  in  research  will  end  up teaching  in  post-secondary
institutions,  constitutes  an  additional  argument  for  government  subsidies  to
research.
BU  As previously  argued,  if  students  and  their  families  can  monitor  the
quality  of education  reasonably  effectively,  the  case  for  subsidies  or
regulation  is  less  strong,  since  there  would  then  be less  likelihood  of  a
divergence  between  the  social  and  private  profitability  of supplying  quality.
James  (1986a)  devotes  considerable  attention  to the  case  where  it is  difficult
for  students  and  their  families  to  monitor  quality. However,  her  discussion
in  this  respect  emphasizes  regulation  rather  than  subsidies.- 26 -
Finally,  another  possible  way of  encouraging  educational  quality
t;Irough  subsidization  is to  tie  institutional  subsidies  to  students'
performance  in  examinations.2/  As several  authors  have emphasized,'
educational  institutions  would  have  an incentive  to favor  admission  of
students  from  high-income  families,  who are  likely  to  perform  better,  under
such  a subsidy  scheme. In  addition,  it is  not  clear  that  the  incremental
productivity  of a given  amount  of  education  has  been greater  for  students  who
score  high  marks  on exams  than  for  those  who score  low  marks. In spite  of
these  objections,  subsidies  based  on students'  performance  may  have  a useful
role  to  play  in countries  with  a substaTitial  private  academic  sector. The
potential  equity  impact  may  be partially  offset  by specific  subsidy  schemes
for  students  from  low-income  families. Furthermore,  performance-based
subsidies  have the  advantage  of requiring  little  or no compliance  monitoring
(beyond  ensuring  that  reliable  examination  procedures  are  used),  and  hence  may
be less  costly  to  administer  than  subsidies  for  particuiar  types  of inputs.
We  will further  discuss  these  issues  below,  in the  context  of considering
different  methods  of quality  regulation.
B.  Government  regulation  of  private  educational  institutions
Subsidies  and  other  financial  incentives  represent  one  way in  which
the  government  can  attempt  to  make  a private  educational  system  perform  in  a
way  that  is consistent  with social  objectives.  In  most cases,  direct
regulation  provides  an alternative  way  of  promoting  the  same  objectives  as
those  justifying  subsidy  policies;  in  other  cases,  regulation  may  provide  the
only  workable  method  to achieve  particular  goals.
W  Under  such  a scheme,  there  clearly  has to  be some  form  of government
regulation  of academic  standards  and  examination  procedures  in  private
institutions.  But  we will  argue  below  that  there  is  a strong  case  for  such
standards  in  any  event.
WM See  James  (1986a);  Jimenez  (1987),  Ch.  5.- 27 -
The  present  situation. In  most  countries,  both  private  and  public
post-secondary  institutions  are  formally  under  the  jurisdiction  of ministries
of education. In  practice,  however,  the  extent  of regulation  of both  types  of
institutions  is  relatively  limited. In  Latin  America,  for  example,  post-
secondary  institutions  are  usually  autonomous  in the  sense  that  they  elect
their  own  governing  bodies. While  there  is  legislation  which  prescribes
conditioiLs  for  establishing  new  public-sector  institutions  and  programs,  and
which  specifies  rules  for  accreditation  and the  granting  of  degrees,  once  an
institution  is  established,  there  is  relatively  little  direct  government
regulatiorn  of the  way it  operates. In some  cases,  guidelines  are  giver.  for
such  things  as student/teacher  ratios  and  qualifications  of instructors.  On
the  other  hand,  under  the  principle  of academic  freedom,  public  universities
usually  have the  responsibility  for  the  design  of  curriculum  and  course
content  with little  or no direct  government  supervision.  There  is,  however,
generally  government  regulation  of the (usually  low)  fees  charged  by public-
sector  institutions,  reflecting  the  fact  that  public  institutions  derive  most
of their  funding  from  government  transfers.
Government  regulation  of  private-sector  institutions  is  even  more
limited,  especially  in  those  countries  where  there  are  relatively  small
amounts  of government  financial.  support  (direct  or indirect)  of private
schools. Again,  while  there  are  some  formal  controls  over  the  establishment
of new  institutions  and  programs,  subsequent  supervision  of such  things  as
teaching  staff  qualifications,  exam  systems,  and  curriculum  design  in  private
institutions  is  often  delegated  to a  public-sector  university  (a "national
university"),  and  enforcement  of government  guidelines  may  be spotty.3 1 In
most  countries,  private-sector  institutions  are  free  to set  their  own  fee
schedules,  although  some  countries  attempt  to enforce  regulations  requiring
some  minimum  proportion  of students  to  be given  "need-based"  scholarships,  and
in some  cases  (Korea)  the  government  tries  to enforce  fee  ceilings  in  private
institutions.
ZU  The  variability  of the  extent  to  which  existing  regulations  are  enforced
is a factor  stressed  in  the  discussion  of  regulation  in  James (1986a).- 28 -
On the  whole,  the  little  information  available  indicates  that,  in
those  countries  where  private  post-secondary  education  is important,
government  regulatory  policy  is  geared  toward  creating  a legal  framework  which
facilitates  establishment  and  expansion  of  private  institutions.  However,
once  they  have  been  established,  the  extent  of  regulation  is  limited.
When should  more  regulation  be encouraged?  An important  determinant
of the  relative  effectiveness  of financial  incentives  and  regulation  as policy
instruments  is  the  degree  of  competitiveness  in the  private  education
industry. If  the  industry  can  be expected  to approximate  the  perfectly
competitive  ideal  reasonably  well,  then  financial  incentives  will  have
predictable  effects  and  work  well. On the  other  hand,  if  competition  is  weak,
the  case  for  direct  regulation  is  stronger. 39
Entry  and  enrollment  restrictions.  In  conventional  micro-economic
analysis,  the  usual  conclusion  is  that  restrictions  on the  output  of existing
firms,  or on  entry  of  new  ones,  reduce  efficiency  rather  than  raise  it.
Furthermore,  when it  is in  society's  interest  to limit  the  expansion  of an
industry  (for  example,  because  of external  costs  which  make  private
profitability  exceed  social),  this  may  be more  efficiently  accomplished  by
imposing  a tax  on the  industry.
As argued  previously,  when  higher  education  is  used  as  a signalling
device,  or as  a basis  for  credentialism,  private  higher  education  should,  in
principle,  be taxed. Taxation  of education,  however,  is likely  to  be
politically  unacceptable  as well  as inconsistent  with  the  equity  objective.
Therefore,  a  policy  of direct  restrictions  on the  expansion  of education  may
represent  the  only  way in  which  the  efficiency  objective  can  be met,
M/  One  factor  that  influences  the  degree  of competitiveness  in  an industry  is
the  cost  and  difficulty  for  buyers  (students)  to accurately  assess  the  quality
of the  output  of different  firms. Thus  the  question  of the  difficulty  of
quality  assessment  becomes  important  in  this  context  as  well.- 29 -
especially  if  education  continues  to  be subsidized  to some  extent  for  reasons
of equity.
Several  important  issues  arise  in the  design  of this  type  of  policy.
First,  effective  restrictions  would  require  limits  both  on the  number  of
institutions  allowed  to offer  post-secondary  education,  and  on the  number  of
students  in  each  institution.  If  there  are  economies  of scale,  individual
enrollment  limits  should  be set  high enough  to  permit  minimum  cost  production;
this  may  pose  problems  In  terms  of regional  distribution  objectives.  Second,
overall  enrollment  limits  would  tend  to  cause  an  excess  demand  for  educational
services  (especially  if  students  were subsidized',  thereby  allowing  private
institutions  to  charge  high fees. To  preserve  the  intent  of the  equity
objective,  some  type  of controls  would  then  have  to  be imposed  on the  fees
that  institutions  would  be allowed  to  charge. Admissions  would  therefore  have
to  be rationed  in  some  other  way, for  example  by secondary  school  performance.
Third,  with  a private  excess  demand  for  higher  education,  private  institutions
would  have little  incentive  to devote  resources  to  maintaining  high  standards
of quality,  so that  specific  quality  regulations  might  have to  be used  as
well.
Regulatory  management  in  a situation  of generalized  excess  demand  is
a  complex  task,  whether  in  a  private  or  public  educational  system. This
conclusion  strengthens  the  case  for  a  policy  in  which  the  equity  objective  is
addressed  primarily  through  targeted  subsidies  (perhaps  in  combination  with
regulation  of  minimum  academic  admission  standards,  as discussed  below). By
limiting  public  subsidies  to students  from  low-income  families,  the  extent  of
excess  demand  is  reduced. Note that  this  argument  can  be taken  to apply  to
the  issue  of implicit  subsidization  of  education  in  public-sector  institutions
as  well as  private  ones.!?
Z2/ The  effects  on efficiency  and  equity  of a strategy  of reducing  excess
demand  for  public-sector  education  through  increased  use  of fees,  are
extensively  discussed  in Psacharopoulos,  Tan,  and  Jimenez  (1986),  and  in
Jimenez  (1987).- 30 -
Regulation  of fees.  Setting  maximum  limits  on the  fees  that  private
institutions  are  allowed  to  charge  is  sometimes  justified  by appeal  to the
need for  preventing  "profiteering"  by private  institutions.  The  argument
implies  that  there  is inadequate  competition  in  the  private  education  market,
since  competition,  if it is  sufficiently  effective,  will tend  to drive  fees
down  until  they  reflect  production  costs.
The  assumption  that  competitive  forces  are  weak  may  well  be
justified  in  many cases,  especially  in  areas  of study  where  large  economies  of
scale  create  barriers  to  entry,  or  where  entry  of  new institutions  or
expansion  of existing  ones  are  subject  to restrictive  government  licensing.
However,  one  problem  with  using  fee  ceilings  as a  way  of overcoming  the
effects  of ineffective  competition  is  that  institutions  may respond  by
reducing  educational  quality. Thus  fee  ceilings  may  have  to  be accompanied  by
some  form  of quality  regulation.  Since  effective  quality  regulation  is
difficult  and  costly,  this  can  again  be considered  as an argument  against
relying  on fee  ceilings  as a  way  of resolving  the  equity  issue.
It is sometimes  suggested  that  regulation  should  also  be used  to
prescribe  minimum  fee  levels.2V In the  absence  of regulation,  competition
among  institutions  to  attract  students  may  lead  to  very low  fee  levels  coupled
,..ith  deteriorating  quality  standards.  However,  if  the  need  for  such
regulation  arises  from  a  presumed  inability  of students  and  employers  to
adequately  monitor  the  quality  of educational  services,  then  a  minimum  fee
level  is  unlikely  to  be effective.  Unless  quality  can  be observed  and
monitored,  institutions  will  have  little  incentive  to raise  it,  no matter  how
high the  fees  they  charge.
Regulation  of other  admissions  criteria. Another  possible  form  of
public  regulation  of  private  institutions  is  specification  of minimum  academic
standards  of admission  to  private  institutions.  As noted  above,  this  is  a
common  way  of coping  with  potential  excess  demand  for  places  in  public-sector
James  (1986a)  discusses  this  policy.- 31 -
post-secondary  institutions,  and  may  be used  for  similar  reasons  when
education  in  private-sector  institutions  is  heavily  subsidized.  It can  also
be seen  as a  way of  protecting  academically  weak  students  (and  their  families)
who overestimate  the  expected  profitability  of  enrolling  in  a course  of post-
secondary  education.
"Rationing  by marks"  (i.e.,  observed  secondary  school  performance)
does  at first  glance  appear  to  be a "fair"  and  efficient  way  of coping  with  a
situation  of  private  excess  demand  for  subsidized  post-secondary  education.
However,  several  qualifications  must  be noted. First,  it  presupposes  some
type  of standardization  of the  evaluation  methods  used  to  assess  the
performance  of graduates  from  different  secondary  schools,  to  prevent
artificial  "grade  inflation"  in  response  to the  enhanced  private  profitability
of improved  secondary-school  grades. Second,  from  an efficiency  point  of
view,  "rationing  by marks"  will  be  most  appropriate  if  it is true  that  the
'value  added"  (from  society's  point  of  view)  of  post-secondary  education  is
correlated  with the  absolute  level  of  achievement  in  secondary  school. Third,
"rationing  by marks"  may  conflict  with the  equity  objective  in  several  ways.
For  reasons  previously  noted,  students  from  high-income  families  are  more
likely  to  be able  to obtain  good  secondary-school  grades  than  students  from
lower-income  families. An implication  of this  is  that  when  admission  to  post-
secondary  education  is "rationing  by marks",  general  subsidies  will  have  a
regressive  impact. That  this  is  so  has  been  confirmed  by empirical  studies  in
a number  of countries.W  In  addition,  "rationing  by marks"  also  to some
extent  implies  a directly  regressive  effect,  since  it favors  those  with
greater  innate  ability  over  those  with  less,  regardless  of initial  family
income  and  wealth.
In spite  of these  qualifications,  "rationing  by  marks"  could  have a
useful  role  to play  as  one  component  of an  overall  policy  package  toward  post-
secondary  education. The  objection  that  it tends  to  be inequitable  would  be
mitigated  if it  were  used in  combination  with  a program  of targeted  subsidies,
2V  See,  for  example,  Mingat  and  Tan (1985),  Fields  (1980),  and  Blaug  (1982).- 32 -
in the  form  of scholarships  or loan  guarantees  for  students  from  low-income
families. Furthermore,  if  it  were  true  that  the  expected  productivity  gain
from  post-secondary  education  is  positively  correlated  with secondary  school
performance,  a combination  of targeted  subsidies  and  "rationing  by marks"
could  lead  to a substantial  efficiency  improvement.  On one  hand,  it  would
make it  easier  for  talented  students  from  low-income  families  to invest  in
post-secondary  education;  on the  other  hand,  it  would  discourage  investment  by
less  talented  individuals  from  high-income  families.M/  In addition,  rationing
access  to  post-secondary  education  may  also  promote  efficiency  when  education
serves  as a signalling  device  or  as the  basis  for  credentialism.  In  these
circumstances,  the  social  profitability  of education  is  relatively  low  to
begin  with,  so that  any  policy  that  reduces  resource  use in  the  educational
sector  would  tend  to improve  efficiency.
As noted  earlier,  academically  weak  students  and  their  families  may
also  have  a tendency  to  overestimate  the  expected  profitability  of  post-
secondary  education,  simply  as  a result  of inadequate  information  concerning
the  intellectual  prerequisites  necessary  to  benefit  from  post-secondary
training. If  this  is so,  a case  can  also  be made  for  regulating  admission
standards  in  private  institutions  on the  grounds  that  there  is  a need  to deter
such  individuals  from  investing  resources  in  post-secondary  education. This
argument  can  be construed  primarily  as  being  based  on efficiency
considerations:  it can  be seen  as  a second-best  response  to a situation  where
it is  costly  and  difficult  for  individuals  to  acquire  the  information  that
would  be required  in  order  for  them  to  make  choices  that  would  be "better"
both for  themselves  and  for  society  as a  whole.
A variant  of this  strategy  is to  impose  no regulations  on admission
requirements  of private  institutions,  but instead  to ration  educational
subsidies  both  by family  income  level  and  secondary  school  performance.  This
type  of strategy  could  also  be e.pplied  in the  context  of policies  toward
public-sector  institutions.- 33 -
Regulation  of educational  quality. There  appear  to  exist  large
quality  differentials  within  both the  private  and  public  sub-sectors  in a
given  country,  based  on  what  little  evidence  exists. As noted  earlier,  there
are  some  countries  (especially  in  Latin  America)  where  the  private  sub-sector
contains  small  elite  universities  that  apply  stringent  admissions  criteria  and
offer  educational  services  of  high  quality. In other  countries  (such  as
Brazil  and  the  Philippines,  for  example),  the  highest  quality  of education  is
offered  in  elite  universities  in  the  public  sector. At the  same  time,  mass
education  of relatively  low  quality  is  offered  in  either  or both  of the
private  and  public  sectors  in  different  countries.
Ideally,  quality  regulation  in  the  education  sector  should  refer  to
the  output  produced  by educational  institutions,  i.e.,  the  education  services
themselves.  However,  these  services  cannot  be easily  measured  or  monitored.AW
Therefore,  regulation  will,  in  practice,  focus  on either  certain  inputs  (such
as  academic  qualifications  of teaching  staff,  student-teacher  rations,  etc.),
or relate  to the  contents  of the  courses  being  taught  (curriculum  regulation),
or the  standards  used  in  evaluating  student  performance  and/or  granting  of
degrees.
There  are  several  problems  with input  regulation. First,  some
inputs  may  be difficult  for  regulators  to  monitor,  just  as they  are  for
students  and  parents. This  would  be true,  for  example,  for  such  inputs  as
'personal  attention  by instructors  to  students'  problems,"  etc. Second,
compliance  with  regulations  concerning  quantitatively  defined  input  standards
(such  as student-teacher  ratios,  proportion  of teachers  with  advanced  degrees,
and  so on)  does  not guarantee  that  the  inputs  covered  by these  standards  are
effectively  used.  Similar  problems  arise  under  a strategy  of curriculum
regulation.
2"  This  is  emphasized  by James  (1986a). In addition  to  constituting  an
argument  for  quality  regulation,  monitoring  difficulties  may  also  explain  with
both  governments  and  students  may  have a  preference  for  non-profit  educational
institutions:  they  may  be less  inclined  than  profit-making  ones  to exploit
the  costly  monitoring  situation  by reducing  qualitv.- 34 -
Regulations  specifying  degree  requirements  and the  standards  of the
evaluation  procedures  that  are  used in  the  degree-granting  process  do not in
themselves  guarantee  that  institutions  will  maintain  high  quality  in the
educational  services  they  provide. However,  in  a situation  where  it is
difficult  for  employers  to  directly  monitor  the  quality  of the  training
received  by students  at  educational  institutions  (as  well  as the  on-the-job
performance  by graduates),  standardized  examinations  may  serve  as  an indirect
guarantee  concerning  the  ability  and  skills  of students  who  are  able  to  pass
them,  thereby  making  graduiates  more  valuable  to  employers. The  ability  of an
educational  institution  to increase  a student's  chances  of passing  such
examinations  (by  providing  educational  services  of  high  quality)  will
therefore  be valuable  to students. As a result,  students  will  be willing  to
pay  more for  the  services  of such  institutions,  indirectly  providing  an
incencive  for  them  to supply  high-quality  services.
One important  advantage  with  this  type  of quality  regulation  is that
decisions  on  how  quality  will  be maintained  (through  provision  of  more  and
better  inputs,  or through  attempts  at using  educational  inputs  more
effectively)  are  left  to school  managers,  rather  than  to regulators.  For  this
reason,  there  is,  in  our  view,  a strong  case  in  favor  of government  regulation
of evaluation  standards  in  private  institutions.  In  practice,  such  regulation
may  simply  take  the  form  of  a government-organized  system  of common
examinations  for  candidates  in  particular  courses  of study,  and/or  a
government-organized  system  of external  examiners  overseeing  the  evaluation
procedures  in  post-secondary  institutions.  Regulations  of this  type  already
exist  in  public  systems  of  post-secondary  education  in  many  parts  of the
world,  and  would  not  be difficult  to  organize  in  systems  with  a substantial
private  sector.M/ In  fact,  one  would  expect  that  voluntary  adherence  to
externally  set  evaluation  standards  would  be in the  interest  of those  private
WU For  a careful  review  of an  attempt  to  use  standardized  examinations  as  an
instrument  to improve  efficiency  and  equity  in  primary  education,  see
Somerset's  (1983)  description  of the  1976  examination  reforms  in  Kenya.35 -
post-secondary  institutions  that  wish to  attract  students  by acquiring  a
reputation  for  high  educational  standards.
Finally, it is sometimes  suggested that requiring all private
educational  institutions  to  be run  on a  non-profit  basis  would  indirectly  tend
to raise  educational  quality.Wg  While  it is  possible  that  funds  which  would
otherwise  be distributed  as  profits  would  be expended  in such  a  way as to
raise  quality,  it is  far  from  certain  that  this  would  occur: they  may instead
be spent  in  ways  which  raise  the  real  income  of school  managers  or teachers.
Furthermore,  a  non-profit  requirement  will,  if  effective,  reduce  the  incentive
for  new  entrants  to  the  industry,  thereby  reducing  competition.  Since
competition  tends  to  raise  quality  (as  well  as reduce  price),  it  is even
uncertain  whether  such  a rule  would  have  a  positive  or  negative  net  effect  on
educational  quality.
C.  Government  policies  in the  markets  for  educated  labor.
While  government  policies  affecting  the  markets  in  which  graduates
are  employed  do not  directly  influence  the  market  for  the  services  of  post-
secondary  institutions,  they  clearly  have  an important  indirect  influence.
The  private  demand  for  education  depends  heavily  on employment  opportunities
and  expected  incomes  of graduates.LV  Moreover,  in  most  developing  countries,
the  public  sector  is  a leading  employer  of graduates  of  post-secondary
institutions.  Therefore,  the  government's  policies  with  respect  to  hiring
practices,  wage  offers,  and  job  security  play  a major  direct  role  in this
labor  market;  they  also  tend  to  set  the  pattern  for  similar  policies  in the
private  sector.
See  James  (1986a). According  to  James,  sever  1 countries  with  a large
private  post-secondary  sector  (Brazil,  Colombia,  South  Korea)  have such  a
requirement,  at least  for  those  schools  that  are  publicly  subsidized.
W/  For  a more  detailed  discussion  and  a literature  review,  see  Blomqvist
(1986).- 36 -
Inflexibility  in  the  wage  rates  for  graduate  labor  has often  been
cited  as  one  reason  for  graduate  unemployment  and  the  consequent  divergence
between  the  private  and  social  profitability  of education. Indirectly,  such
wage inflexibility  may  also  contribute  to  credentialism  which  introduces  a
further  source  of  private-social  divergence.  Earlier  we have  discussed  what
kinds  o!  policies  toward  the  private  education  sector  are  appropriate  if one
wants  to  partially  offset  the  effects  of this  type  of divergence.  The  point
to  be made  here is  that  the  need  for  such  policies  can  be reduced  if  wage
inflexibility  is  avoided  in  the  first  place.
Obviously,  thore  are  limits  on the  extent  to  which  goveriuments  can
vary  wage  rates  for  educated  labor  in  response  to fluctuations  in  supply  and
demand. For  example,  a  pattern  in  which  such  labor  receives  regular
increments  to  reflect  seniority  may  be  necessary  in  order  to reduce  labor
turnover. There  may  also  be limits  on the  extent  to  which  the  salaries
offered  to  potential  recruits  can  fall  short  of those  recently  hired.
Nevertheless,  some  flexibility  remains  to  use  public-sector  wage rates  as a
signal  which  responds  to  changes  in the  supply-demand  balance  for  educated
labor. Furthermore,  government  policy  can  be used  to  discourage  the
phenomenon  of credentialism  in  the  labor  market. This  can  be done  simply  by
following  a  principle  of  not  selecting  among  applicants  for  a given  job  on the
basis  of educational  qualifications,  and  to  pay  someone  hired  for  a given  job
the  same  wage rate  regardless  of educational  qualifications.  Finally,  in  some
developing  countries  there  may  be a tendency  for  the  public  sector  to  become  a
de facto  employer  of last  resort  for  post-secondary  graduates.A/  Such  a
policy  is  not only  expensive  to the  government  and  inequitable  (especially
when post-secondary education is subsidized):  it also  contributes powerfully
to  making  the  private  profitability  of education  exceed  the  social
profitability,  and to  creating  an  uneconomic  expansion  of  both  the  private  and
public  education  sectors.
R  For  an analysis  of the  effects  of such  a policy,  see  Blomqvist  (1982).- 37 -
V.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
The  extent  and  type  of  private  higher  education  in  developing
countries  certainly  indicated  that  there  is  a potential  for  private
institutions  to  play  a  major  role. The  experience  in  several  nations  in  Latin
America  and  Asia  clearly  shows  that  when  the  legal  framework  is there,  private
institutions  will flourish. While  private  institutions  in  some  countries
specialize  in  providing  relatively  low-cost  (and  low-quality)  education  in
particular  fields  (such  as  business  or  commercial  studies,  or general  arts
programs),  there  are  other  countries  in  which  they  function  as elite
universities  at the  high  end  of the  quality  spectrum.
With respect  to the  efficiency  issue,  the  key question  is  whether
the  social  benefits  of  higher  edu:ation  tend  to  exceed  or fall  short  of the
private  benefits. Since  market  supply  and  demand  in  a  private  incentive-
driven  system  tends  to  reflect  private  profitability,  a situation  where  social
benefits  exceed  the  private  tends  to  imply  an  underallocation  of resources  to
education  (both  in terms  of quantity  of  enrollment  and  quality  of educational
services),  and  conversely  for  cases  where  private  profitability  exceeds
social.
Traditionally,  the  presumption  has  tended  to  be that  factors  such  as
capital  market  imperfections,  and  the  general  scarcity  of educated  manpower  in
many  developing  countries,  has led  to a situation  where  the  social  benefits
exceeded  the  private. However,  in  recent  years  there  has  been  evidence  in
many  developing  countries  of a growing  problem  of  graduate  unemployment,  and
tendencies  toward  credentialism  in the  allocation  of desirable  jobs in  the
public  sector  and  elsewhere. In  addition,  it  has  been  suggested  that  the
perception  of  higher  education  serving  as  a socially  unproductive  but
privately  profitable  screen  or signalling  device  may  be quite  as relevant  in
some  developing  countries  aE in  the  industrialized  nations  for  which  the
screening  theories  were  originally  developed. If these  factors  are  important,
a situation  may  be emerging  in  which  the  private  benefits  for  many types  of
higher  education  are  higher  than  the  social. This  clearly  would  have- 38 -
important  implications  for  the  question  whether  higher  education  should  be
subsidized.  Because  this  question  is  so important,  more  empirical  work on
these  issues  should  be a higlh  priority.
From  an equity  point  of riew,  private  post-secondary  education
raises  several  important  issues. In  some  respects,  it is relatively  easy  to
design  an appropriate  policy  strategy  because  there  is  no conflict  between  the
equity  and  efficiency  objectives:  policies  that  zounteract  the  effects  of
capital  market  imperfections,  especially  for  poor  families,  are  an example.
On the  other  hand,  there  are  other  types  of  equity-oriented  policies  that  do
pose  a  conflict  with the  efficiency  objective.  An example  is  a general
subsidy  to  all  post-secondary  students  as a  means  of allowing  poor  students
access  to  universities.  Such  a subsidy  is likely  to  have a regressive  impact
because  children  from  well-to-do  families  are  more  likely  to  make  use  of the
subsidy  than  children  from  poorer  families. This impact  may  be exacerbated  if
access  to the  subsidy  is  rationed  by marks,  for  similar  reasons.
If  higher  education  to a significant  extent  serves  a function  as  a
screen  or signalling  device,  the  regressive  impact  may  be even  worse,  since  an
education  subsidy  will then  in  effect  reduce  the  cost  to individuals  who are
fortunate  enough  to  have  high  productivity  to  begin  with,  of raising  their
market  earnings. In  addition,  when  education  primarily  serves  a screening
function,  its  private  profitability  is  likely  to  be considerably  higher  than
its  social  profitability.  Thus,  general  subsidies  to  post-secondary  education
will  be inconsistent  with  the  efficiency  objective  as  well.
On the  whole,  the  conclusion  that  follows  from  the  above  analysis  is
that  general  subsidization  of  higher  education  may  be a highly  inefficient,  or
evern  counterproductive  way  of redistributing  income  from  rich  to poor.  If
subsidies  are  to  be used to  create  more  equitable  access,  a strong  case  can  be
made for  targeted  subsidies,  e.g.,  scholarships  and/or  loan  guarantees
available  only  to students  from  low-income  families. In this  context,  we also
argue  that  a combination  of targeted  subsidies  and  rationing  access  by marks
may  represent  a sensible  way of  promoting  both  equity  and  efficiency  (if- 39 -
secondary  school  marks  are  correlated  with  a student's  abilit-y  to gain
productivity  through  education).
The  subsidy  issue  arises  also  with respect  to  educational  quality.
Here  we argue  that  the  most  efficient  way of raising  quality  is  probably  to
design  an incentive  system  which  rewards  institutions  on the  basis  of the
performance  of their  graduates.  This  would  give  institutions  an incentive  to
make  efficient  use  of all  inputs  into  the  production  of education  services,
while  a strategy  of subsidizing  quality  by means  of subsidies  to  particular
inouts  will  create  distortions  in  the  production  process. A problem  with
performance-based  strategy,  however,  is that  it  may  have a  regressive
distributional  impact,  since  students  from  high-income  families  are  more
likely  to  perform  well  in examinations  and  there_ore  ind_rectly  benefit  from
such  subsidies.
When general  subsidies  are  used  for  distributional  reasons,  one  way
of reducing  the  overall  cost  to  the  government  is  to limit  access  to
subsidized  education  through  direct  enrollment  restrictions.  In  order  to
avoid  "profiteering",  however,  this  strategy  has to  be combined  with
regulations  involving  fee  ceilings  as  well  as  minimum  quality  standards.  We
argue  in the  paper  that  such  a strategy  for  controlling  an  excess  demand  for
education  will  be difficult  to  enforce  in  comparison  with a strategy  of lower
and/or  more "targeted"  (on  low-income  students)  subsidies.  However,  we also
argue  that  a  case  can  be independently  made  for  specific  quality  regulation,
on the  basis  that  the  government  may  be better  able  than  students  and
employers  to  monitor  quality. In  this  context  also,  one  can  make  a
distinction  between  regulation  that  focuses  on  quality  control  over  the  output
(graduating  students)  rather  than  on inputs. Thus  one  can  make  a strong  case
for  government  regulation  governing  exam  marking  and  evaluation  of students.
Finally,  there  are  certain  important  government  policies  which  do
not  directly  affect  the  education  system,  but  which  are  likely  to  have  a  very
significant  indirect  impact  because  they  affect  the  labor  market  for  graduates
from  the  post-secondary  system. These  policies  involve  such  things  as labor- 40 -
market  legislation,  and  the  behavior  of the  government  as an  employer.
Inappropriate  policies  with  respect  to this  market  may  have contributed  to
problems  of graduate  unemployment,  credentialism,  and  a generally  swollen
bureaucracy  in some  countries. In turn,  these  factors  have  contributed  to
creating  a  wedge  between  the  social  and  private  profitability  of  higher
education,  with consequences  that  have  been  outlined  above. Government
policies  in these  areas  may  be at least  as important  in influencing  the
functioning  of the  higher  education  system  as  various  forms  of direct
regulation  or subsidy.- 41 -
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